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Executive Summary  
 
The United Kingdom (UK) and Canada face uncertainty as they respectively manage relations with their 
largest trading partners: both the UK's withdrawal from the European Union (EU) post-Brexit and an 
aggressive American pivot toward a protectionist trade agenda threaten stability and economic prosperity. 
Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) have prospered from a productive commercial relationship. Their 
two-way merchandise trade totaled more than C$25.3 billion in 2016, making the UK Canada’s fifth-
largest merchandise trade partner and making Canada the UK’s eighth biggest export market outside the 
EU. The UK is the second largest source of FDI to Canada and Canada’s second most significant 
destination for FDI abroad. Brexit has made the future of this relationship uncertain. Crucial to the future 
of Canada-UK relations is the possibility of a new Canada-UK Free Trade Agreement (FTA). CETA will 
not apply to Canada-UK trade after the UK leaves the EU on March 29, 2019. Canadian Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau and UK Prime Minister Theresa May have said that both countries are working on a 
Canada-UK FTA for after 2019. For Canada-UK bilateral trade negotiations to be successful, policy 
makers must address the reasons why the UK voted for Brexit, and why the recent US election resulted in 
a populist administration and protectionist agenda. We examine how Canada and the UK can deliver on a 
trade agenda that is progressive in nature, inclusive in impact, and supported by Canadian and British 
citizens-as-voters. 
We examine the prospect for a progressive free trade agreement (FTA) between Canada and the UK.  
Canada has been very active in negotiating and signing trade agreements and we examine the provisions of 
these agreements (e.g. CETA, CPTPP) to highlight best practices in building support to overcome 
domestic opposition. Our analysis finds that the provisions regulating labour and the environment within 
FTAs are progressively expanding in both scope and legal enforceability. FTAs have become attractive 
fora to negotiate non-trade rules in exchange for market access because FTAs can link non-trade policy 
objectives within increasingly ‘judicialized’ treaties. At the limit, such regulatory commitments can be 
made more enforceable when they are linked to trade agreements, as trade retaliatory measures could be 
permitted in the event of non-compliance, either as a result of dispute settlement or by unilateral action. 
Whether or not labour and environmental provisions can meet their national policy objectives still remains 
dependent on domestic factors such as the political will and resources to enforce these laws. 
Brexit will reduce income per capita in the UK. To mitigate the economic costs of leaving, the UK 
should remain closely integrated into the Single Market and maintain similar access to other partner 
countries that the UK currently enjoys through EU membership, including Canada. The UK and Canada 
should negotiate an FTA with strong environmental and labour provisions. It would be progressive, but 
unprecedented to include an independent enforcement body or explicit targets for the parties to achieve 
within the commitments of the trade agreement. Based on our analysis of recent Canadian FTAs, a 
progressive Canada-UK FTA could be signed but it is not clear that these provisions will be effective at 
addressing issues such as independent monitoring and enforcing labour, environmental and social rights, 
or achieving government’s nationally determined emission reductions under the Paris Agreement. 
Introduction 
Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) have prospered from a productive commercial relationship. Their 
two-way merchandise trade totaled more than C$25.3 billion in 2016, making the UK Canada’s fifth-largest 
merchandise trade partner and making Canada the UK’s eighth biggest export market outside the EU. The 
UK is the second largest source of FDI to Canada and Canada’s second most significant destination for 
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FDI abroad. Brexit has made the future of this relationship uncertain. Various trade and financial 
institutions, such as Export Development Canada (EDC), the Business Development Bank of Canada 
(BDC), and the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) note that Brexit may affect Canadian exports and investments. 
Brexit could make the UK a less attractive destination for Canadian investment due to uncertainty over the 
UK’s market access to the EU. Further, Brexit could result in Canadian exporters facing the same tariff 
structure that was in place before the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA). This would raise the costs of doing business, particularly for exporters of Canadian 
services. For these reasons, Canadian businesses may direct more of their business to the EU.  
Crucial to the future of Canada-UK relations is the possibility of a new Canada-UK Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA). CETA will not apply to Canada-UK trade after the UK leaves the EU in 2019. Canadian 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and UK Prime Minister Theresa May have said that both countries are 
working on a Canada-UK FTA for after 2019. Under a 'Global UK', negotiating a deep integration trade 
agreement with Canada would allow the UK a stepping stone into lucrative markets in Asia Pacific and Latin 
America. One trade option therefore is to maintain the bilateral market access between Canada and the UK 
gained with the implementation of CETA. This gives rise to the need to design a trade agreement that 
supports both business and social interests. Some believe that the UK and EU will end up with a CETA-
like trade deal. Is the “progressive” nature of CETA a good fit for a Canada-UK trade deal as well, or are 
there more appropriate approaches to take greater account of public concerns about the social and 
environmental effects of trade agreements?  
Policymakers need to determine what a Canada-UK FTA should look like and how to pursue it. 
This may be the ideal opportunity for Canada and the UK to build on their common values and shared 
institutions to establish their policy positions in a post-Brexit context. This would provide an early harvest 
of trade commitments and inform future negotiations with other trading partners. Although there has been 
push-back from countries like China towards Canada’s progressive trade policy agenda, a trade partner like 
the UK offers more promise. This paper assesses whether Canada-UK trade relations can engage diverse 
stakeholders to develop a trade agreement that is both comprehensive and progressive in nature.  
One issue for analysis is understanding why there is a growing reaction against deeper economic 
integration. It is also useful to understand why FTAs fail to live up to societal expectations. Who are the 
losers from free trade and who opposes free trade and globalization? Who are the supporters of Brexit and 
the US Trump administration? Various civil society groups are increasingly questioning trade policy despite 
its potential to bring tangible economic benefits to firms and consumers alike. While the long-term 
macroeconomic benefits from international trade are well-documented, the empirical evidence for 
individual consumer gains is less understood and communicated. Policymakers must understand and 
address the challenges created by FTAs and create an economic environment that will benefit more people 
if a Canada-UK FTA is to be successful in the long-run and provide a model for the UK trade agenda.  
Anti-globalization sentiment triggered in part by rising income inequality helped create the 
preconditions for Brexit and the election of a populist and protectionist American president. Canada has 
mostly avoided this. However, the Canadian economy is not immune from the rise of income inequality 
and, therefore, anti-globalization movements. Brexit should be a “wake-up” call for Canadian policymakers 
to address increased social inequality and avoid isolationist movements that threaten the economic and 
social benefits of an open economy.  
Understanding these dynamics will allow for proactive steps to be taken to prevent a future 
breakdown of a Canada-UK trade agreement. A comprehensive survey of the provisions and negotiating 
history of other free trade agreements including NAFTA, CETA, Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP) will help to identify the demands and limits of both business and civil society. For a Canada-UK 
FTA to be successful in the long-run and provide a clear model for the future UK trade agenda, 
policymakers must address the challenges created by FTAs and build an economic environment that are 
perceived to be more widely beneficial. 
This paper examines whether and how a Canada-UK trade agreement can bring an 'early harvest' 
success story to the UK trade agenda post-Brexit and for Canada to push its progressive trade agenda in 
this new era of aggressive unilateralism in the US. Several of Canada’s most recent multilateral trade 
agreements support deep integration; however, Canada has been pushing this “progressive trade” agenda 
with mixed results. Yet, with shared values and similar institutions, the UK provides an ideal opportunity 
for Canada to bring its progressive trade agenda forward with a favourable partner. The UK was an 
important market of the recent Canada –EU CETA agreement and with Brexit that market is now missing 
from that agreement. On the other hand, Canada also provides an ideal partner for the UK to develop its 
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nascent trade agenda and build its trade negotiating capacity in a post-Brexit world. The commercial 
relationship between these two countries is supported by shared values, cultures, and a positive colonial 
relationship. Following the strategy of 'Global Britain,' the UK could find that closer economic ties with 
Canada serves as a useful springboard into lucrative Asia Pacific and Latin American markets.  
Our paper focuses on how Canada and the UK can take advantage of this unique opportunity to 
design a trade agreement that is comprehensive and progressive in nature and provides the architecture for 
a new, next generation of trade agreements. The challenge Canada and the UK face are of balancing 
progressive trade policies that deliver economic benefits with a trade agreement that is seen to benefit society 
more widely and does not threaten sovereignty. Canadians and Britons must ask if Canada’s progressive 
trade agenda is a good model for a Canada-UK FTA. Inclusion efforts may impact free trade but can help 
to develop a more successful, publicly supported bilateral agreement. In sum, this research identifies whether 
Canada-UK trade relations present a timely opportunity for the UK to develop a free and fair trade external 
trade policy post Brexit, while Canada builds its distinct strategy of inclusive international trade in the face 
of the renegotiation of NAFTA and increased US protectionism. 
Labour and environmental regimes in regional trading arrangements: 
Lessons for a Canada-UK fair and progressive FTA 
 
The demand for the regulation of behind-the-border issues, such as labour and environmental standards, is 
an increasingly common feature of international trade negotiations. Now that many countries have 
successfully negotiated the inclusion of such provisions within regional trade agreements (RTAs), questions 
are emerging on the relative merits of the different approaches taken by the parties. This paper assesses how 
international labour and environmental law within RTAs has developed and identifies areas of relevance for 
a future Canada – UK fair and progressive trade agreement.1 The paper employs a multi-dimensional 
method of legal analysis to clarify the relative nature of these trading regimes. The results are used to 
determine whether there has been a significant shift in the way labour and environmental standards are 
being incorporated into RTAs in response to social demands, or ‘collective preferences.’2  
The paper shows that the provisions regulating labour and the environment within RTAs are 
progressively expanding in both scope and legal enforceability. One of the reasons RTAs have become an 
attractive fora from which to negotiate non-trade law in exchange for market access concessions is because 
these agreements can link non-trade policy objectives within increasingly ‘judicialized’ treaties.3 At the limit 
such regulatory commitments can be made more enforceable when they are linked to trade agreements 
because trade retaliatory measures could potentially be permitted in the event of non-compliance either as 
a result of dispute settlement or by unilateral action.  
This paper contends while these regional developments could be considered ‘WTO Plus’ to the 
extent that the WTO does not seek to regulate either labour or the environment, an overview of the rules 
suggests that even under the most recently negotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
agreement (the so-called USMCA), there are still clear limits to how far these RTA provisions encroach on 
the domestic regulatory sovereignty of any of the parties to an agreement. That is, were the UK and Canada 
to negotiate an FTA with environmental and labour provisions, they would be unprecedented if they were, 
for example, to include an independent enforcement body or explicit targets for the parties to achieve within 
the commitments of the trade agreement. 
                                                 
1 The agreements chosen were: Australia-Singapore; Australia-Thailand; Chile-Efta ; Efta-Mexico; Efta-Singapore; Efta-Korea; Singapore-Korea; Singapore-India; Canada-Chile; 
Canada-Costa Rica; Chile-EU; Japan-Singapore; Japan-Mexico; Japan-Malaysia, Japan-Philippines, The NAFTA; US-Jordan; US-Singapore; US-Chile; US-Morocco; US-CAFTA-
DR; US-Australia; US-Bahrain; US-Oman; US-Peru and US-Korea. 
2 In 2004 Pascal Lamy defined collective preferences as ‘the end result of choices made by human communities that apply to the community as a whole.’ The speech also 
acknowledged that both the ‘collective’ or community and collective preferences were difficult to define, not always rational, open to dispute but ultimately to be seen as values. P. 
Lamy. ‘The emergence of collective preferences in international trade: implications for regulating globalization.’ Conference on “Collective preferences and global governance: what 
future for the multilateral trading system”, Brussels, 15 September 2004. 
3 ‘Judicialization’ is seen as the increasing reliance on judicial or quasi-judicial solutions to international disputes and the strengthened enforcement of binding sets of objectives. 
The term ‘judicial’ and its derivations have the advantage of distinguishing between legislative and judicial functions of international institutions. De Bièvre, Dirk (2006) 'The EU 
regulatory trade agenda and the quest for WTO enforcement', Journal of European Public Policy, 13:6, 851 – 866. 
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The Rise of Environmental Provisions in FTAs 
The agreements' preambles and objectives 
This section identifies whether or not the subject matter under analysis is explicitly related to the overall 
trade obligations of the regional members. The preamble to an RTA does not contain any binding 
obligations upon the Parties; the statements are not intended to be operative provisions in the sense of creating 
specific rights or obligations. Rather, the statements offer a context for the signatories’ overall objectives by 
introducing the agreement, setting out the motives of the contracting Parties and the objectives to be 
accomplished by the provisions of the statutes. 
Nevertheless, a preamble is designed to establish a definitive record of the intention or purpose of 
the Parties in entering into the agreement, and this can inform or ‘colour’ the interpretation of a treaty 
provision. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides that the preamble 
forms part of the treaty text and, as such, part of the terms and ‘context’ of the treaty for purposes of 
interpretation.4 The Appellate Body of the WTO has also emphasized on several occasions that Article 31 
VCLT is a fundamental reference point for WTO dispute settlement. There is therefore a basis in customary 
international law for the preamble to any treaty, including an RTA, to be used as a source of interpretative 
guidance in the process of implementation and dispute settlement.  
 
Pre-2010 FTAs 
Given that an agreement’s preamble objectives indicate how the subject is - or is not - related to the trade 
obligations of the regional members, it is significant that many of the early RTAs did not express themselves 
on the Parties’ environmental objectives in the preamble.5 However, this was not the same set of RTAs or 
signatory countries as those that did not include labour statements in their RTA preamble. The EFTA and 
the India-Singapore RTAs, for example, include environmental but not labour statements in the preamble 
to their agreements. All of the US RTAs contain at least one reference to protecting and enhancing the 
environment in the preamble. The most used model6 identified here sets out social development goals 
together in a single statement. The EU-Chile preamble expresses the need ‘to promote economic and social 
progress for their peoples, taking into account the principle of sustainable development and environmental 
protection requirements.’ Similarly, the US-Australia RTA simply states that the Parties will implement the 
agreement in a manner ‘consistent with their commitment to high labour standards, sustainable 
development, and environmental protection.’ The benchmark for ‘high standards’ is not set out however.  
The preamble to the EFTA, US–Peru, India–Singapore, and US-CAFTA-DR RTAs follow a model 
that includes one or two statements exclusively on the environment. These statements indicate the Parties’ 
commitment to implement the agreement in a manner consistent with environmental protection and 
conservation, and to promoting sustainable development. The US-Singapore and US-Chile preambles go 
the furthest, by including an additional reference to promoting regional environmental cooperative activities 
and existing commitments to multilateral environmental agreements. Boilerplate language is identified in 
those RTAs with a separate environmental side agreement.7 These contain a specific commitment to the 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment of 1972 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
of 1992 in the preamble to the side agreement. The preambles to the main NAFTA provisions and to the 
Canada-Chile agreement also contain environmental statements that are similar to those set out in the US-
Chile RTA. 
 
Post-2010 RTAs 
                                                 
4 Article 31 of the VCLT provides in relevant part: 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble 
and annexes.  
Article 32 of the VCLT provides: ‘Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.’ 
5 This list includes: Australia – Thailand, Australia – Singapore, all the RTAs with Japan (Mexico, Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines), and the Singapore – NZ and Singapore – 
Korea RTAs. 
6 The US-Jordan, US-Morocco, US-Bahrain and US-Korea RTAs. 
7 The NAFTA/NAAEC, Canada-Chile, Canada-Costa Rica. 
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Of the four most recent RTAs surveyed here,8 all of them include at least one expression on the environment 
in their preambles. The most minimal is the CPTPP preamble, which includes just one recital to reaffirm 
the importance of promoting corporate social responsibility, cultural identity and diversity, environmental 
protection and conservation, gender equality, indigenous rights, labour rights, inclusive trade, sustainable 
development and traditional knowledge, as well as the importance of preserving their right to regulate in the 
public interest. The USMCA preamble on the other hand includes three expressions. The first recognizes 
the parties’ inherent right to regulate and resolve to preserve the flexibility of the Parties to set legislative 
and regulatory priorities, in a manner consistent with this Agreement, and protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety, the environment, the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources, the integrity and stability of the financial system and public morals, in 
accordance with the rights and obligations provided in this Agreement. Second, the parties agree to protect 
human, animal, or plant life or health in the territories of the Parties and advance science-based decision 
making while facilitating trade between them. Third, to promote high levels of environmental protection, 
including through effective enforcement by each Party of its environmental laws, as well as through 
enhanced environmental cooperation, and further the aims of sustainable development, including through 
mutually supportive trade and environmental policies and practices. 
Both the EU Singapore and the CETA agreements include two similar expressions. Both preambles 
state that the parties are determined/committed to strengthen their economic, trade, and investment 
relations in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, in its economic, social and 
environmental dimensions, and to promote trade and investment in a manner mindful of high levels of 
environmental and labour protection and relevant internationally-recognised standards and agreements to 
which they are Parties. They also reaffirm each Party’s right to adopt and enforce measures necessary to 
pursue legitimate policy objectives such as social, environmental, security, public health and safety, 
promotion and protection of cultural diversity. 
The scope of obligations for the subject area 
The scope of an international treaty can be primarily delimited in terms of its geographical coverage. This 
is determined by the territorial jurisdiction of the signatories. Its scope can also be viewed temporally, in 
terms of the date the treaty entered into force and its expected duration. The focus of this paper is on the 
scope of the subject matter within the provisions of the treaty. This includes the types of rights covered by 
the agreement and whether these rights will be based on national or international standards. An assessment 
of these provisions can identify how wide or narrow the scope of agreement’s obligations is, along with the 
standards the provisions are seeking to apply. 
The key variables identified here include first, whether or not the agreement references or 
incorporates other bodies of international law. The EC-Chile RTA expresses commitment to relevant ILO 
conventions,9 for example. Second, whether the agreement reaffirms the supremacy of national laws or 
alternatively establishes an independent regional law.  And third, in the case of allegations of non-compliance 
between the parties to the agreement, whether the RTA provisions set out a ‘trade affecting’ requirement 
that requires the party alleging non-compliance to identify a ‘link’ between the non-enforced law and its 
impact on trade between the parties. Such a requirement sets a higher threshold for a non-compliant 
measure to be violation of the agreement. 
 
The Early FTAs 
The range of environmental obligations identified in the earlier RTAs surveyed ranged from those 
agreements without any provisions, to those with a commitment to implement Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs) within a chapter or side agreement dedicated to regulating the environment. In 
between these extremes are provisions limited to detailing environmental cooperation activities and those 
linking environmental standards to investment activities between the parties to the agreement.  
Thus, at one extreme, and despite including preamble statements on the environment, are the earlier 
FTA agreements that do not contain any environmental provisions.10 The scope of the environmental 
provisions in Japan–Mexico and Japan-Malaysia RTAs goes slightly further to set out environmental 
                                                 
8 USMCA, CPTPP, CETA, EU-Singapore. 
9 EC-Chile RTA. Article 44:1. 
10 The Japan-Philippines, Article 5.11. Similarly, the India–Singapore RTA includes a statement in the preamble on environmental protection, yet the only relevant provision 
regulating the environment is set out within the chapter on Standards and Technical Regulations, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
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cooperation activities, including information exchange and capacity building related to the Clean 
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol.11 Nevertheless, the provisions make no other reference 
to either the Parties’ domestic environmental standards or law enforcement, or to any commitments to 
multilateral environmental agreements. The minimal model set out in the Japan–Philippine RTA does not 
contain any statements relating to the environment in their preamble, but Article 102 states that the Parties 
should not encourage investments by investors of the other Party by relaxing its environmental measures. 
This is similar to the labour provision preventing ‘race to the bottom’ standards and policy within this RTA 
and it is also subject to the general Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the agreement. Although it is 
links environmental standards only in the area of investment, it has legal strength from being covered by 
the general trade agreements’ DSM. 
The model12 most favoured by the US is characterised by a separate environment chapter with 
boilerplate provisions recognizing the right for each Party to the agreement to set their own domestic laws 
and standards of environmental protection. The Parties make a commitment that ‘high standards’ of 
protection are to be continually improved upon. However, the ‘high standard’ is not made with reference 
to an independent benchmark. The Parties instead make a commitment not to fail to enforce each their 
domestic environmental laws effectively and agree that all enforcement activities relating to the environment 
must be confined to a Party’s own country.13 This model of agreement explicitly recognizes the role of 
multilateral environmental agreements but they do not reference any of them by name within the provisions 
of the agreement. The RTAs with the environmental side agreements14 similarly include provisions with an 
express right for each Party to set their own ‘high’ level of domestic protection and nationally defined 
policies and priorities for the environment. Each Party ‘shall’ then enforce these laws effectively 
domestically.  
Those RTAs with side-agreements have chosen to include provisions which maintain existing rights 
and obligations under other MEAs, including conservation agreements:  
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to affect the existing rights and obligations of the Parties 
under other international environmental agreements, including conservation agreements, to which such 
Parties are party.15 
 
Thus, the NAFTA affirms the rights of the Parties under certain international and bilateral environmental 
agreements, including the right to use discriminatory trade measures. These rights prevail over obligations 
in the NAFTA in the event of an inconsistency. That is, market access rights granted under the NAFTA 
could potentially be undermined by rights to restrict trade according to a Multilateral Environmental 
Agreement (MEA), where the NAFTA members are Parties to the MEA. This contrasts with the GATT 
and other agreements, which are superseded by the NAFTA obligations as long as they are in conformity 
with Article XXIV GATT. The investment section of the NAFTA contains provisions using terminology 
that is vague, such as ‘environmentally sensitive’ and the Parties are ‘encouraged’ not to relax environmental 
measures to promote investment. The NAFTA also allowed for general exceptions for some environmental 
reasons as they appear in the GATT, except for the explicit incorporation of both living and non-living 
exhaustible natural resources. 
 
Post-2010 RTAs 
 
The more recent agreements surveyed have moved away from including a side agreement on the 
environment. The EU-Singapore, EU-Canada CETA, the USMCA and the CPTPP RTAs all have a chapter 
dedicated to the environment or sustainable development and these chapters are addressing a wider scope 
of issues within the chapter, such as sustainable fishing and timber trade. Nevertheless, what has not changed 
                                                 
11 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the "flexibility" mechanisms defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (IPCC, 2007). It is intended to assist the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and compliance with quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments (greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
caps).  
12 This includes the US-Singapore, US-CAFTA-DR, US-Chile, US-Oman,  US-Morocco,  US-Bahrain, US-Australia, US-Korea RTAs. 
13 These agreements all define environmental law to mean any domestic statute, regulation or provision primarily designed to protect the environment, or prevent a danger to 
human, animal, or plant life or health, through: the prevention, abatement, or control of the release, discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental contaminants; the control 
of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals, substances, materials and wastes, and the dissemination of information related thereto; or the protection or conservation of wild 
flora or fauna, including endangered species, their habitat, and specially protected natural areas. 
14 The NAFTA/NAAEC, Canada-Chile and Canada-Costa Rica RTAs. 
15 The NAAEC. Article 40. 
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is the focus on implementing domestic regulation and, as with the traditional EU FTAs, the emphasis of 
the CETA and EU-Singapore agreements remains focused on cooperation and dialogue rather than a 
sanction-based dispute settlement. While its provisions on trade and sustainable development create 
enforceable obligations that have the same legal value as any other obligation in the agreement. The 
agreement’s provisions on trade and sustainable development are subject to a dedicated dispute settlement 
mechanism. This mechanism has a transparent, mandatory, participatory and time-bound procedure for 
resolving trade-related sustainable development issues. However, these do not have the same level of 
sanctions as the trade provisions. Under the KAFTA, for example, disputes related to environment 
provisions are explicitly excluded from the main dispute settlement mechanism covering the agreement, 
focusing on consultation and dialogue in implementing the agreement in each of the parties’ sovereign 
jurisdiction 
The scope of the New-NAFTA, the USMCA, has expanded considerably to address issues such as 
Protection of the Ozone Layer Protection of the Marine Environment from Ship Pollution Air Quality 
Marine Litter Trade and Biodiversity Invasive Alien Species Marine Wild Capture Fisheries Sustainable 
Fisheries Management Conservation of Marine Species Fisheries Subsidies Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Conservation and Trade Sustainable Forest Management and Trade 
Environmental Goods and Services Indigenous peoples and local communities. However once again, the 
enforcement of environmental laws is still based at a domestic level. For the Parties recognize the sovereign 
right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and its own 
environmental priorities, and to establish, adopt or modify its environmental laws and policies accordingly. 
Although each Party shall strive to ensure that its environmental laws and policies provide for, and 
encourage, high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve its respective 
levels of environmental protection. The USMCA environment chapter also references MEAs,16 affirming 
each member’s commitment to implement the multilateral environmental agreements to which it is a party. 
The Parties also commit to consult and cooperate as appropriate with respect to environmental issues of 
mutual interest, in particular trade-related issues, pertaining to relevant MEAs. Such as, exchanging 
information on the implementation of MEAs to which a Party is party; ongoing negotiations of new 
multilateral environmental agreements; and, each Party's respective views on becoming a party to additional 
multilateral environmental agreements. 
The scope of issues covered in the CPTPP cover those in the USMCA, with an additional provision 
covering Transition to a Low Emissions and Resilient Economy.17 As with the USMCA, while the 
provisions recognise the importance of mutually supportive trade and environmental policies and practices 
to improve environmental protection in the furtherance of sustainable development. The Parties maintain 
domestic enforcement of environmental law. They recognise the sovereign right of each Party to establish 
its own levels of domestic environmental protection and its own environmental priorities, and to establish, 
adopt or modify its environmental laws and policies accordingly. However, as with the USMCA, the 
commitments explicitly do not empower a Party’s authorities to undertake environmental law enforcement 
activities in the territory of another Party. Although no Party shall fail to effectively enforce its 
environmental laws through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction in a manner affecting trade 
or investment between the Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement for that Party. Each 
Party has the right to exercise discretion and to make decisions regarding: (a) investigatory, prosecutorial, 
regulatory and compliance matters; and (b) the allocation of environmental enforcement resources with 
respect to other environmental laws determined to have higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties 
understand that with respect to the enforcement of environmental laws a Party is in compliance with 
paragraph 4 if a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of that discretion, or results from 
a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of those resources in accordance with priorities for 
enforcement of its environmental laws. A Party shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to 
waive or otherwise derogate from, its environmental laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the 
protection afforded in those laws in order to encourage trade or investment between the Parties.18 The 
CPTPP also recognizes the importance of the multilateral environmental agreements to which they are 
party, and affirms commitment to implement the MEAs to which each is a party.19 The Parties emphasize 
the need to enhance the mutual supportiveness between trade and environmental law and policies, through 
                                                 
16 Article 24.8: Multilateral Environmental Agreements. 
17 Article 20.15: 
18 CPTPP Article 20.3 
19 CPTPP Article 20.4: Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
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dialogue between the Parties on trade and environmental issues of mutual interest, particularly with respect 
to the negotiation and implementation of relevant MEAs and trade agreements. 
Under the EU-Singapore and CETA agreements, the level of protection is also still based at the 
national level, the focus is on cooperation and consultation, and less issues are covered – only Trade in 
Timber and Timber Products and Trade in Fish Products, in the former,20 while the EU CETA 
environmental provisions are expanded by trade favouring environmental protection, Trade in forest 
products and trade in fisheries and aquaculture products.21 
Institutions and agencies 
This section of the assessment identifies and compares the different institutional settings provided by these 
agreements to deal with the implementation of the relevant obligations. This includes the creation of 
agencies, special committees or commissions with the aim of monitoring or developing the issues which 
emerge from the area under regulation. Alternatively, it could create a single contact point within a 
government ministry to coordinate any work associated with the obligations of the agreement. 
Of additional interest are questions concerning whether there is merely a textual reference in the 
agreement to the role of this body or contact point, without further action specified. In some cases, the 
agreement may conversely set out mandatory meeting schedules, resource allocations and objectives. 
 
Early RTAs 
Of the earlier RTAs surveyed, the most commonly used institutional arrangement for dealing with 
environmental issues is a Joint Committee established under the general administrative provisions of the 
agreement.22 While this Joint Committee should be composed of government officials from each Party while 
there is no specific requirement for any environmental experts. Other US RTAs create a separate agency in 
the form of the Environmental Affairs Council which is composed of cabinet level or equivalent 
representatives of the Parties.23 The agreement commits the Council to meet at least once a year to discuss 
the implementation and progress of the environmental provisions included in the agreement.  
Despite having a side agreement on environmental regulation, the Canada-Costa Rica RTA only 
requires24 that each Party designate a point of contact for communications between the Parties and from 
the public related to the implementation and elaboration of the agreement. In contrast with this, the side 
agreements included in the NAFTA -the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (the 
NAAEC) and the Canada-Chile Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (CCAEC), establish a much 
more elaborate supranational institutional in the form of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation. 
The Commission is made up of a Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public Advisory Committee. The 
Secretariat must consider any submission from any non-governmental organization or person asserting a 
Party to the agreement is failing to enforce its environmental law effectively, subject to conditions.25 These 
provisions also commit the Parties to create National Advisory Committees (NACs), which comprise of the 
public and NGOs to offer input on the implementation and further elaboration of this Agreement. The 
Parties may also convene a governmental committee to advise further on the implementation and further 
elaboration of the side-agreement. 
 
Post-2010 RTAs 
 
The institutional arrangements under the post-2010 RTAs have been consolidated in the later models. Under 
the USMCA agreement, the requirement is for the establishment of an Environment Committee and 
Contact Points.26 The Environment Committee must be composed of senior government representatives, 
or their designees, of the relevant trade and environment national authorities of each Party responsible for 
                                                 
20 Article 12.7 Trade in Timber and Timber Products 
Article 12.8 Trade in Fish Products 
21 Article 24.9 Trade favouring environmental protection 
Article 24.10 Trade in forest products 
Article 24.11Trade in fisheries and aquaculture product 
22 The US–Singapore, US-Oman US-Jordan, US-Morocco, US-Bahrain, US-Australia RTAs. 
23 The US-CAFTA-DR, US-Chile, and the US-Korea RTAs. 
24 The Canada-Costa Rica RTA. Article 10. 
25 If it is, inter alia: is in a designated language, provides sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the submission, ‘appears to be aimed at promoting enforcement 
rather than at harassing industry’ and is filed by a person or organization residing or established in the territory of a Party. 
26 Article 24.26: Environment Committee and Contact Points 
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the implementation of this Chapter. The Environment Committee is to oversee the implementation of this 
Chapter and its functions include discussion, information exchange, senior consultations on enforcement 
matters. After meeting within one year of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Environment 
Committee shall meet every two years unless the Environment Committee agrees otherwise. During the 
fifth year, the Environment Committee shall review the implementation and operation of this Chapter; 
report its findings and recommendations to the Council and the Commission. 
Under CETA, the institutional mechanisms consist of a designated office to serve as contact point 
with the other Party for the implementation of the Chapter, including with regard to cooperative 
programmes and activities, the receipt of submissions, communications and information to be provided to 
the other Party, the Panel of Experts, and the public.27 In addition, the Committee on Trade and Sustainable 
Development established under the trade and sustainable development chapter shall oversee the 
implementation of the environment Chapter and review the progress achieved under it and discuss any 
matters of common interest.28  The Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, shall be comprised 
of high level representatives of the Parties responsible for environmental matters.29 The Committee on 
Trade and Sustainable Development must meet within the first year of the entry into force of this 
Agreement, and thereafter as often as the Parties consider necessary. A dialogue is also established with a 
Civil Society Forum composed of representatives of civil society organisations should also be convened 
once a year unless otherwise agreed.30 
The arrangement is similar under the EU Singapore FTA. Each Party designates a contact point 
with the other Party and establish a Board on Trade and Sustainable Development comprised of senior 
officials from within the administrations of each Party. The Board shall meet within the first two years and 
thereafter as necessary, to oversee the implementation of this Chapter.31 Each meeting of the Board shall 
include a public session with stakeholders to exchange views on issues related to the implementation of this 
Chapter.  
Under the CPTPP, a contact point and an Environment Committee composed of senior 
government representatives is also established to discuss and review the implementation of this Chapter. 
The Committee shall meet within the first year and thereafter every two years unless otherwise agreed.32 
The Committee shall provide for public input on matters relevant to the Committee’s work, as appropriate, 
and shall hold a public session at each meeting. 
Monitoring, enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms 
This section assesses how strong or binding the obligations are in terms of ensuring the parties fulfil the 
negotiated obligations. This can be shown by identifying the RTA provisions regulating how disputes are 
settled in the event of non-compliance. Relevant questions include whether disputes relating to the 
commitments covering labour standards or the environment fall under the same dispute settlement 
provisions that cover the commitments regulating the trade in goods, or whether they have separate DSM 
provisions of their own, which may not be as strong as those covering the trade provisions.   
The characteristics of the DSM are also assessed for whether or not they extend beyond ´good 
offices´ and ´ conciliation´ to include an independent report and recommendations or directives for remedial 
action. The possible final remedies are identified to see whether actions or enforcement activities must be 
limited to the domestic legal order. Further, whether private parties, producers or consumers can be made 
the beneficiary of a remedy, or whether they are limited only to the states involved in the dispute. In the 
event that a Party fails to remedy its violation of its obligations there may be a right of countervailing action 
in the agreement, in addition to the ultimate action of withdrawing from the overall agreement. Lastly, the 
agreements are scanned for conflict clauses or articles setting out the hierarchy of international agreements 
in the event of conflict of obligations. These indicate the ultimate priority accorded to the obligations of the 
various international agreements entered into by the parties to an RTA. 
 
The Early RTAs 
 
                                                 
27 CETA Article 24.13 Institutional Arrangements  
28 CETA Article 26.2.1(g) (Specialised committees 
29 CETA Article 22.4 Institutional mechanisms 
30 CETA Article 22.5 Civil Society Forum 
31 EU Singapore Article 12.15 Institutional Set up and Monitoring Mechanism 
32 Article 20.19: Environment Committee and Contact Points 
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Among the earlier RTAs, the strongest DSM identified was in the US-Jordan RTA. Environmental disputes 
are subject to the core dispute settlement provisions and procedural requirements of the RTA. However, 
the Parties to the agreement have recourse to dispute settlement only if the other Party fails to enforce its 
domestic environmental laws effectively - and in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, which 
introduces the high violation threshold. The more elaborate but weaker DSM used by the US states that any 
‘interested person’ can request investigations into alleged violations of domestic environmental law.33 These 
agreements also commit the Parties to ensuring that judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative proceedings 
are available, alongside effective remedies or sanctions for violations of its environmental laws. These 
remedies may include compliance agreements, penalties, fines, imprisonment, injunctions, the closure of 
facilities, and the cost of containing or cleaning up pollution. In a further act of deference to sovereign 
policy space, the US-CAFTA-DR RTA contains a provision explicitly exempting one Party the right to 
review another Party’s domestic enforcement mechanisms: 
 
‘nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to call for the examination under this Agreement of whether a 
Party’s judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative tribunals have appropriately applied that Party’s 
environmental laws.’34 
The DSM within the ‘environmental side agreement’ model35  states that if after consultation and other 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have failed, a panel must determine where there has been a 
persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained against to effectively enforce its environmental law.36 
The disputing Parties may then agree to a mutually satisfactory action plan. The NAAEC’s DSM also allows 
access to private citizens as ‘interested Parties’ to make submissions to the CEC Secretariat to document 
alleged non-enforcement of environmental laws by one or more of the NAFTA Parties. However, once 
again, the definition of interested Parties’ is not set out, and is unclear therefore on whether an international 
environmental NGO would be included in this definition. This may depend on whether such an NGO had 
standing within the domestic legal system of each Party. Indeed, nothing entitles a Party to undertake 
environmental law enforcement activities in the territory of another Party. Further, no Party can provide for 
a right of action under its law against any other Party on the grounds that another Party has acted in a 
manner inconsistent with the agreement. Further there is a requirement for a request for a panel to be 
approved by a two-thirds vote of the Parties. This implies an ultimate reliance on diplomatic means for 
ensuring the majority vote needed to form a panel. 
Article 104 of the NAFTA states that in the event of an inconsistency between the NAFTA and 
the trade provisions of multilateral environmental treaties, the latter shall ‘prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency.’ However, it has been argued that the actual significance of this provision is unclear. 
Currently, there are no formal dispute settlement mechanisms available under multilateral environmental 
treaties should a member complain about trade sanctions taken against it because of the alleged lack of 
compliance with environmental obligations. The only potential legal recourse for countries is the dispute 
settlement mechanism available under GATT.  However, it is not clear whether Article 104 applies to the 
Parties GATT obligations and whether Article 103 includes the GATT in its definition of ‘other 
agreements.’37  
 
The conflict clause included in the US-Korea RTA is also unclear: 
In the event of any inconsistency between a Party’s obligations under this Agreement and a 
covered agreement, the Party shall seek to balance its obligations under both agreements, but this 
shall not preclude the Party from taking a particular measure to comply with its obligations 
                                                 
33 These are set out in the US-Singapore, US-Oman, US-Morocco, US-Chile, US-Bahrain, UK-Korea RTAs. 
34 This RTA also has a unique provision which states that a person or organization residing or established in the US must file a submission under the NAAEC agreement 
(NAFTA) asserting that the US is failing to enforce its environmental laws effectively and may not file a submission under the US-CAFTA-DR provisions. This is presumably 
designed to coordinate and streamline the administrative application of US environmental RTA obligations in the north and central Americas. 
35 The NAAEC, Canada-Chile and Canada-Costa Rica RTAs. 
36 See The NAAEC. Article 33. 
37 Howse and Treblicock. Op cit. p549. 
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under the covered agreement38, provided that the primary purpose of the measure is not to impose 
a disguised restriction on trade.39 
 
Post 2010 RTAs 
 
Under the USMCA dispute settlement mechanism,40 if the consulting Parties fail to resolve their dispute 
through environment consultations, Senior Representative Consultations and Ministerial Consultations 
within 60 days, the requesting Party may request consultations under Dispute Settlement Consultations or 
request the establishment of a panel under the Dispute Settlement chapter.41 This panel can seek technical 
advice or assistance, if appropriate, from an entity authorized under CITES to address the particular matter, 
and provide the consulting Parties with an opportunity to comment on any such technical advice or 
assistance received. This is similar to the CPTPP dispute resolution mechanism for the environment 
provisions42 which states that ultimately, a dispute over the implementation of an environmental provision 
may be referred to the relevant Ministers of the consulting Parties who shall seek to resolve the matter.43 
Under the CETA dispute settlement mechanism,44 any dispute that arises under the trade and 
environment Chapter, the Parties shall only have recourse to the rules and procedures provided for in the 
Chapter, not the dispute resolution chapter covering the trade commitments. Rather the Parties are to rely 
on good offices, conciliation, or mediation to resolve that dispute. The EU Singapore dispute settlement 
provisions also rely on government consultations with Panels of Experts. Indeed, the RTAs’s Dispute 
Settlement chapter and mediation mechanism do not apply to the environment provisions.45 
Assessing environmental law in RTAs 
The pioneering environmental provisions in the NAFTA’s 1994 NAAEC were replicated in the Canada-
Chile (CCAEC) RTA, and set the tone for future agreements including the most recent USMCA, CPTPP, 
CETA and EU-Singapore agreements. The most significant limitation to ensuring high environmental 
standards is that there is no regional harmonisation of environmental law. Again, in none of the agreements 
surveyed can a Party impose its level of environmental protection on another Party; all Parties are obligated 
to ensure the effective enforcement of the standards it has determined domestically. There are discernible 
differences, such as the CCAEC containing a more cooperative mechanism than the NAAEC, which instead 
incorporates a more punitive response to non-compliance based on the unilateral suspension of NAAEC 
benefits. This better reflects the development needs of the Parties to the former agreement, which explicitly 
excludes the use of trade sanctions and its penalty relies on a monetary fine imposed by a panel. Using more 
a carrot than stick approach, Canada provides Chile with cooperation programmes and capacity building 
measures designed to increase environmental enforcement mechanisms and assess the environmental 
impact of trade agreements. This might also induce a convergence with Canada’s standards, although it is 
not an explicit objective of the agreement.  
In the latest FTAs, with the exception of the KAFTA, there has been an expansion of environmental law 
included in the EU-Singapore, EU-Canada and the CPTPP. All FTAs have a chapter dedicated to the 
environment or sustainable development and these chapters are addressing a wider scope of issues within 
the chapter, such as sustainable fishing and timber trade. Nevertheless, what has not changed is the focus 
on implementing domestic regulation and, as with the traditional EU FTAs, the emphasis of the CETA and 
EU-Singapore agreements remains focused on cooperation and dialogue rather than a sanction-based 
dispute settlement. While its provisions on trade and sustainable development create enforceable obligations 
that have the same legal value as any other obligation in the agreement. The agreement’s provisions on trade 
and sustainable development are subject to a dedicated dispute settlement mechanism. This mechanism has 
a transparent, mandatory, participatory and time-bound procedure for resolving trade-related sustainable 
                                                 
38 “Covered Agreements” are those listed in Appendix 1 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes negotiated during the Uruguay 
Round. They include the  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; the  Multilateral Trade Agreements, including the GATT, GATS and TRIPs; and subject to 
conditions, four plurilateral agreements. 
39 US-Korea RTA. Article 21.10:3. 
40 USMCA Article 24.32: Dispute Resolution 
41 USMCA Article 31.7 (Dispute Settlement – Establishment of a Panel).  
42 CPTPP Article 20.23: Dispute Resolution 
43 CPTPP Article 20.22: Ministerial Consultations 
44 CETA Article 24.16 Dispute resolution 
45 EU-Singapore. Article 12.16 Government Consultations 
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development issues. However, these do not have the same level of sanctions as the trade provisions. Under 
the KAFTA, disputes related to environment provisions are explicitly excluded from the main dispute 
settlement mechanism covering the agreement, focusing on consultation and dialogue in implementing the 
agreement in each of the parties’ sovereign jurisdiction. 
Whether through the initial influence of the US negotiators, the CPTPP and the USMCA possess 
a strong dispute resolution mechanism that is applicable to its environmental provisions.46 For if the 
consulting Parties have failed to resolve the matter under the provisions for Environment Consultations, 
Senior Representative Consultations or Ministerial Consultations within 60 day after the request, the 
requesting Party may request consultations under the dispute settlement chapter applicable to the other 
obligations, or request the establishment of a panel. This panel shall seek technical advice or assistance, if 
appropriate, from an entity authorised under CITES to address the particular matter and provide the 
consulting Parties with an opportunity to comment on any such technical advice or assistance received. If 
in its final report the panel determines that the measure at issue is inconsistent with a Party’s obligations or 
a Party has otherwise failed to carry out its obligations in this Agreement; or the measure at issue is causing 
nullification or impairment the responding Party shall eliminate the non-conformity or the nullification or 
impairment. A complaining party may also claim compensation if the issues has not been resolved in a 
reasonable time period. 
While all the RTAs surveyed sought to ensure that all obligations remain on enforcing domestic 
environmental standards, some of the agreements also contain clauses setting out the hierarchy of the RTA 
in relation to other international agreements signed by the parties.47 This clearly serves to promote and 
reinforce high environmental obligations, while the conflict clause in the EFTA RTAs, on the other hand, 
subordinates the RTA to the rights and obligations of the WTO as well as any other international agreement 
the Parties may be a signatory to.48 The Australia-Thailand RTA affirms not only the Parties existing rights 
and obligations under the GATT Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement but also ‘all other 
international agreements, including environmental and conservation agreements, to which the Parties are 
Party.’49 This arguably removes the need for any environment provisions in the trade agreement. If the 
parties are already enforcing international environmental agreements, this would, in any event, take 
precedence over the RTA obligations in the event of conflict.  
The Rise of Labour Provisions in FTAs 
The preamble 
Earlier RTAs 
 
Of the earlier RTA preamble statements surveyed, the models identified range from those agreements 
without any statements on labour in the preamble, to those with a preamble dedicated to labour issues in a 
side agreement dedicated to labour regulation, sitting apart from the main trade agreement. Within this 
range, a salient feature is that all trade agreements signed with the US contain at least one reference to labour 
standards in the preamble. However, except when negotiating agreements with the US, the RTAs between 
Australia, NZ, Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Korea, Philippines and EFTA do not have any 
statements on labour in the preamble.  
The most general preamble statements are those which group labour, environmental and social 
development issues together within one objective.50 The US RTA model preamble tends to include one or 
                                                 
46 CPTPP Article 20.23: Dispute Resolution 
47 This is ‘provided that where a Party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the alternative 
that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement. Article 104 NAFTA.  
48 See for example, the EFTA-Singapore, Article 4 or Chile-Korea, Article 1.3. 
49 The Australia-Thailand, Article 703(1). 
50 US-Singapore preamble: Recognizing that economic development, social development, and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing components 
of sustainable development, and that an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system can play a major role in achieving sustainable development. 
US-Australia preamble: committing the parties to implement the Agreement in a manner consistent with their commitment to high labour standards, sustainable development, and 
environmental protection. 
The US-Morocco preamble: Desiring to strengthen the development and enforcement of labor and environmental laws and policies, promote basic workers’ rights and sustainable 
development, and implement this Agreement in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation. 
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more boilerplate statements directed exclusively towards improving labour conditions. These statements 
can be both relatively weak, such as the US-Peru RTA which simply agrees to ‘improve’ labour conditions, 
without specifying standards or rights; or as with the US-Oman RTA, they can show intent to enforce basic 
workers’ rights and to strengthen labour law enforcement.51 
Those RTAs with a separate side agreement on labour regulation52 contain a statement on enforcing 
basic workers’ rights similar to that set out in the NAFTA. This preamble focuses on increasing domestic 
labour rights and standards in addition to respecting commitments to international labour standards and 
domestic law enforcement mechanisms. However, while they are more detailed than the other RTAs, the 
statements’ intentions go no further than those set out in the preamble of those RTAs that accommodate 
labour provisions within the main trade agreement, such as the US-Chile RTA for example.53 
 
Post-2010 RTAs 
 
All the post-2010 FTAs surveyed include at least one preamble recital relating to labour. The USMCA 
promotes the protection and enforcement of labour rights, the improvement of working conditions, the 
strengthening of cooperation and the Parties’ capacity on labour issues. While the CPTPP reaffirms the 
importance of promoting labour rights alongside other public interest issues. The CETA agrees to 
implement the Agreement in a manner consistent with the enforcement of their respective labour laws and 
that enhances their levels of labour protection, and building upon their international commitments on labour 
matters. The EU-Singapore has two statements noting their determination to promote trade and investment 
in a manner mindful of high levels of labour protection and relevant internationally-recognised standards 
and agreements to which they are Parties, while reaffirming each Party’s right to adopt and enforce measures 
necessary to pursue legitimate policy objectives. 
The scope of the labour provisions 
Earlier FTAs 
It is of little surprise that those earlier RTAs surveyed which have no aspirational reference to labour in their 
preamble, do not contain any specific labour provisions within the body of the trade agreement either.54 Yet 
this does not necessarily reflect on their domestic labour standards. For instance, a government may have 
signed up to relevant ILO Conventions independently of its trade agreements. Australia, for example, has 
been particularly vocal about the misuse of labour laws in RTAs for the purposes of economic 
protectionism, while also being a member of the ILO since 1919 and ratifying 47 labour conventions55.  The 
US, on the other hand, became an ILO member in 1934 (with a break between 1977 and 1980) and has 
ratified only 14 conventions56 but unlike Australia, insists on including labour regulation in its RTAs. Certain 
labour rights have also been identified by the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work (ILO Declaration) as ‘fundamental rights’ of all people regardless of whether a government has 
ratified any labour conventions and regardless of whether or not any RTA it negotiates sets out these 
commitments.  These fundamental rights include: freedom of association; the right to organize and bargain 
collectively; non-discrimination in employment; freedom from forced labour; a minimum age of 
employment for children; and eliminating the worst forms of child labour. 
Leaving aside those RTAs without any labour provisions, the earliest model of labour provisions 
with the most minimal scope of application can be identified in the Japan-Philippines RTA. This agreement 
subsumes labour regulation within one investment and labour provision, which focuses solely on ‘not 
weakening’ domestic labour laws to encourage investment. 57 The use of the word shall is interpreted by 
courts to be stronger than the term should and compels the Parties to maintain their existing labour laws. 
                                                 
51 The US-Bahrain and US-Oman agreements use identical language. The US-CAFTA-DR model has two separate statements on labour standards, including the enhancement and 
enforcement of ‘basic’ workers’ rights and conditions, as well as introducing an agreement to strengthen cooperation between the Parties on labour matters. 
52 The NAFTA, Canada–Chile and Canada-Costa Rica RTAs. 
53Build on their respective international commitments and strengthen their cooperation on labor matters; Protect, enhance, and enforce basic workers’ rights. 
54 All EFTA bilaterals, Singapore-India, Japan-Malaysia, Korea-Singapore, NZ-Singapore, Australia-Thailand and Australia-Singapore. 
55 The complete Australian list is located at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm 
56 The complete US list is located at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm 
57 Japan-Philippines RTA. Article 103. 
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These labour laws are defined within the agreement with specific reference to an ‘exhaustive’ list of 
internationally recognised labour standards.58 
The EC-Chile RTA labour regulation is incorporated within one general provision on social 
cooperation. Article 44:1 expresses commitment to relevant ILO Conventions and topics including, but not 
limited to: the freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and non-discrimination, the abolition 
of forced and child labour and the equal treatment between men and women. The article states that the 
Parties shall give priority to domestic measures aimed at developing and modernising labour relations, working 
conditions, social welfare and employment security.59 However, there are no further details or conditions on how to 
promote or monitor these activities. 
While the US-Jordan labour commitments are also incorporated within one article, the scope is 
unusual. This provision reaffirms the Parties’ commitment to the ILO Declaration and ensures that these 
internationally recognized principles and labour rights are recognized and protected by domestic law. 
However, the obligations go further in stating that: A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its domestic labour laws 
in a manner affecting trade between the Parties.60 Again, the use of the word shall denotes that the Parties have an 
obligation to enforce domestic labour laws which are based on international principles and standards. 
However, it also links those standards to an ‘affecting trade’ test within the agreement. This obligation is 
covered by the agreement’s general DSM should either of the Parties fails to enforce its domestic 
commitments.  The US-Korea RTA significantly broadens this obligation by stating that: Neither Party shall 
fail to effectively enforce its labor laws… through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting 
trade or investment between the Parties… .61 While this agreement contains a separate chapter for labour 
regulation, the scope of the provisions is limited to implementing existing domestic labour laws that reflect 
the principles and rights recognized in the ILO Declaration, see above.  
Those RTAs with a separate side agreement on labour62 also commit the Parties to enforce their 
domestic labour laws. The North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC), for example, 
states that each Party shall promote compliance and effectively enforce its labour law through appropriate 
government action. Article 3 affirms the right of each Party to establish and or modify its own domestic 
labour standards. The NAALC explicitly recognises certain labour principles which are not included in the 
ILO Declaration.63 The same principles are replicated in the Canada-Costa Rica and Canada-Chile RTAs.64 
While these RTAs do not hold labour provisions with non-discrimination rights as extensive as the ILO’s 
fundamental rights,65 they include additional rights with respect to minimum wages, hours, and health and 
safety, migrant workers’ rights, and compensation for workplace injuries.66 These rights are embedded into 
the US trade legislation and are a congressionally-mandated negotiating objective.  
 
Post-2010 RTAs 
 
Under the USMCA each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and practices as stated 
in the ILO Declaration on Rights at Work.67 The parties shall also adopt and maintain statutes and 
regulations, and practices thereunder, governing acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum 
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. The provision replicates the earlier US-Korea 
provision in stating that, no Party shall fail to effectively enforce its labour laws through a sustained or 
recurring course of action or inaction in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties9 after 
the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Again, nothing empowers a Party’s authorities to undertake 
                                                 
58 The right of association; the right to organize and bargain collectively; a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labour; labour protections for children and 
young people, including a minimum age for the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour; acceptable conditions of work with 
respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.  
59 EC-Chile RTA. Article 44:4(c). 
60 US Jordan RTA. Article 6:4(a). 
61 US-Korea RTA. Article 19.2. 
62 NAFTA/NAALC and Canada – Chile/CCALC RTAs. 
63 Including the prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses and the protection of migrant workers. 
64 With the exception of the Canada-Chile agreement’s omission of the protection of migrant workers 
65 These include as a fundamental right: the freedom from discrimination in employment based on race, gender, age or other characteristics. 
66 Also included in the NAALC and the CCALC RTAs. 
67 Article 23.3: Labor Rights. (a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory 
labor; 
(c) the effective abolition of child labor and, for the purposes of this Agreement, a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect 
of employment and occupation. 
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labour law enforcement activities in the territory of another Party. The parties also seek to eliminate all 
forms of forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory child labour and shall prohibit the 
importation of goods into its territory from other sources produced in whole or in part by forced or 
compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory child labour.68 The USMCA also states that no Party 
shall fail to address cases of violence or threats of violence against workers, directly related to exercising or 
attempting to exercise their rights again through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction in a 
manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties.69  
Interestingly, migrant workers are also recognised and are to be protected under its labour laws, 
whether they are nationals or non-nationals of the Party.70 Another controversial paragraph was included 
regarding the goal of eliminating sex-based discrimination in employment and occupation, and support the 
goal of promoting equality of women in the workplace. The provision obligates each Party to implement 
policies that protect workers against employment discrimination on the basis of sex, including with regard 
to pregnancy, sexual harassment, sexual orientation, gender identity, and caregiving responsibilities, provide 
job-protected leave for birth or adoption of a child and care of family members, and protect against wage 
discrimination.71  However, it has been noted,72 that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, which led 
the negotiations with Canada and Mexico, has not highlighted this measure since the deal was concluded. 
This could reflect concern about pro-sovereignty conservatives "expressing outrage at a treaty that tells us 
how to define males and females," especially if this is seen as putting the U.S. in violation of its new USCMA 
commitment. "Shall implement policies" may give some discretion as to what exactly is required. The 
USMCA also includes an ANNEX covering requirements for Worker Representation in Collective 
Bargaining in Mexico.73 This annex requires that Mexico adopt and maintain laws and institutions necessary 
for the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining by January 1st 2019. 
Under the CETA, the right of each Party to set its labour priorities is preserved, although each 
Party shall seek to ensure those laws and policies provide for and encourage high levels of labour protection 
and shall strive to continue to improve such laws and policies with the goal of providing high levels of 
labour protection.74  Nevertheless, the Parties affirm their commitment to respect, promote and realise those 
principles and rights in accordance with the obligations of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work and its Follow-up of 1998, the ILO Decent Work Agenda, and in accordance with the 
ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization of 2008. This also includes non-discrimination 
in respect of working conditions, including for migrant workers.75 The parties also agreed that they shall 
not, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, fail to effectively enforce its labour law 
and standards to encourage trade or investment.76 
Parties to the CPTPP also affirm these obligations as members of the ILO, including those stated 
in the ILO Declaration, regarding labour rights within their territories. Although they recognise that labour 
standards should not be used for protectionist trade purpose,.77 the parties also agree not to waive or 
otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from implementing these labour rights.78 
Against the norm of including a chapter dedicated to trade and labour standards, the EU-Singapore 
labour provisions are incorporated into the general chapter on trade and sustainable development. Under 
the provision on Multilateral Labour Standards and Agreements,79 the parties reaffirm their commitments, 
under the Ministerial Declaration of the UN Economic and Social Council on Generating Full and 
Productive Employment and Decent Work for All of 2006, to recognising full and productive employment 
and decent work for all as a key element of sustainable development for all countries and as a priority 
objective of international cooperation. They also commit to the obligations assumed under the ILO and the 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up. The Parties will also 
                                                 
68 Article 23.6: Forced or Compulsory Labor 
69 Article 23.7 Violence Against Workers 
70 Article 23.8 Migrant Workers 
71 Article 23.9 Sex-Based Discrimination in the Workplace 
72 https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/23/new-nafta-lgbtq-rights-874004 
73 ANNEX 23-A: Worker Representation In Collective Bargaining In Mexico 
74 CETA Article 23.2 Right to regulate and levels of protection 
75 CETA Article 23.3 Multilateral labour standards and agreements 
76 CETA Article 23.4 Upholding levels of protection 
77 CPTPP Article 19.2: Statement of Shared Commitment 
78 Article 19.3.1 (Labour Rights) 
79 EU-Singapore Article 12.3 
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consider the ratification and effective implementation of other ILO conventions, taking into account 
domestic circumstances.  
 
Labour institutions and agencies 
 
Earlier RTAs 
The institutions created to deal with the procedural issues related to the implementation of the agreements’ 
labour commitments range from what could be termed the ‘incorporation’ model to a ‘minimalist’ model. 
The former type subsumes labour regulation issues within the Joint Committee established to administrate 
the entire agreement.80  The opposite of this consists of an individual government official acting as a national 
contact point.  
Within this framework, the minimalist approach identified in the US-Morocco RTA involves a 
commitment from both Parties to designate a domestic contact point at a national level within the labour 
ministry to implement the labour provisions attached to the agreement. Beyond this, there is little more than 
a voluntary option to convene a national labour advisory committee and to publish relevant reports ‘where 
appropriate.’ Stronger commitments81 create a specific regional labour affairs council or labour commission 
to attend to the implementation of labour provisions contained in the agreement.82 In the Canadian RTAs, 
a ‘Ministerial Council’ comprised of the labour affairs ministers is established to oversee and promote the 
implementation of the side agreement.83 The NAFTA’s NAALC side agreement sets out the most elaborate 
regional structure in the Commission84 aided by a National Administrative Office belonging to each Party.85 
 
Post-2010 RTAs 
 
Under the USMCA labour chapter, a Labour Council  is established composed of senior governmental 
representatives and shall meet within one year of the date of entry into force of this Agreement and 
thereafter every two years, unless the Parties decide otherwise.86 During the fifth year the Council shall 
review the operation and effectiveness of this Chapter and thereafter may undertake subsequent reviews 
and shall issue a joint summary report or statement on its work at the end of each Council meeting. A 
contact point shall also be designated within each party’s labour ministry or equivalent entity to facilitate 
regular communication and coordination between the Parties, including responding to requests for 
information.87 This arrangement is also established under the CPTPP agreement.88  
Under the CETA, each Party must designate an office to serve as the contact point for the 
implementation of this Chapter, including with regard to cooperative programmes and activities in 
accordance, the receipt of submissions and communications and information to be provided to the other 
Party, the Panels of Experts and the public.89 This labour contact point is complemented by the Committee 
on Trade and Sustainable Development, which oversees the implementation of the  labour chapter and 
review the progress achieved under it, including its operation and effectiveness. 
The EU-Singapore trade and sustainable development chapter requires an office within each 
parties’ administration to serve as contact point with the other Party for purposes of implementing this 
Chapter. A Board on Trade and Sustainable Development is also established, comprised of senior officials 
from within the administrations of each Party. This Board must meet within the first two years, and 
thereafter as necessary, to oversee the implementation of this Chapter. Each meeting of the Board shall 
include a public session with stakeholders to exchange views on issues related to the implementation of this 
Chapter.90 
                                                 
80 US-Singapore, US-Oman and US-Jordan model. 
81This is seen in the US-Chile and US-CAFTA-DR agreements, for example. 
82 This body must be recruited from cabinet level or equivalent. All decisions must be taken by consensus and should be made public along with any labour reports. 
83 The Council is assisted by the National Secretariat of each Party, which in turn may set up National Advisory committees. However, the Canada-Costa Rica agreement does not 
set out a specific requirement for this Council to meet. 
84 The NAFTA NAALC. Article 8. 
85 This is to be comprised of labour ministers of the Parties or their designees and must meet at least once a year. 
86 USMCA Article 23.14: Labor Council 
87 USMCA Article 23.15: Contact Points 
88 CPTPP Article 19.12: Labour Council Article 19.13: Contact Points. 
89 CETA Article 23.8 Institutional mechanisms 
90 EU Singapore. Article 12.15 Institutional Set up and Monitoring Mechanism 
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The dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) 
 
The enforceability of labour provisions in the RTAs surveyed can also be arranged along a continuum. On 
one end the labour obligations are covered under the general DSM and can therefore be viewed in the same 
light - and with the same level of enforceability - as the trade obligations in the agreement. At the other 
extreme, the Parties simply desire to comply with their domestic labour laws and policies, without any 
enforcement mechanisms to promote these objectives beyond this hortatory commitment. The ‘median’ 
model provides a set of remedies, including fines and trade sanctions potentially, but only in the event that 
a Party persistently fails to comply with its domestic labour obligations in a manner affecting trade between 
the parties. 
 
Early RTAs 
 
An example of the first model is the DSM is set out in the Japan - Philippines RTA. This incorporates its 
labour objectives within the investment provisions and a dispute arising under the labour and investment 
provision may be brought to the general dispute settlement mechanism.91 For instance, if one Party 
considers that the other has weakened its labour laws to encourage investment, it can request consultations 
with the other Party with a view to avoiding any ‘race to the bottom’ in labour standards. An arbitral 
tribunal92 must be created to determine whether a Party has failed to comply with its obligations. In such a 
situation, the agreement provides that ultimately one Party may temporarily, and subject to certain 
procedural restrictions, suspend its obligations to the other Party arising under the agreement. This 
suspension must, where possible, be restricted to the same sector or sectors to which the impairment relates; 
in effect, only within investment. The US-Jordan labour provision also falls under the agreement’s general 
DSM. This mechanism is potentially stronger than the other DSMs surveyed because it can allow ultimately 
for an independent supranational dispute settlement mechanism.93 If the arbitral panel finds a failure has 
occurred, the complaining Party may withdraw trade benefits or take other appropriate measures until the 
non-conforming Party comes into compliance with its labour commitments. However, the US-Jordan 
agreement is distinct. 
The most common early DSM model entitles a Party to bring a dispute only if another Parties’ 
domestic labour laws are ‘not effectively enforced, through a sustained or recurring action or inaction, and in a manner affecting 
trade between the Parties.’ 94 A further salient feature is that only governments can invoke the DSM; a Party 
cannot provide private rights of action under its domestic law against the other Party on the ground that a 
measure of the other Party is inconsistent with this Agreement. The procedural guarantees within the labour 
chapter require that each Party provides ‘remedies’ to ensure that a Party either implements its labour 
commitments or faces various penalties. Remedies include: orders, fines, penalties, or temporary workplace 
closures, depending on whether they are already provided for in the Party’s domestic laws. A specific 
provision is included concerning ‘non-implementation in certain disputes’, which states that if a resolution 
is not reached the complaining Party may request that a panel is reconvened to impose an annual monetary 
assessment. These monetary assessments are to be paid into a fund established by the Joint Committee for 
‘appropriate labour initiatives’ such as efforts to improve or enhance law enforcement in the territory of the 
Party complained against, consistent with its law. If the complaining Party cannot obtain the funds from the 
other Party after a given time frame, ultimate measures include suspending tariff benefits under the 
agreement as is necessary only to collect the assessment. 
Another earlier DSM model can be ascribed to RTAs that hold separate labour side agreements. 
This side agreement contains its own DSM,95 separated from the DSM covering the trade obligations in the 
main agreement. Within the side agreement’s DSM, again the focus is on enforcing domestic laws; one Party 
is prohibited from enforcing labour law in the territory of the other Party. That is, private rights of action 
are not provided for under one Party’s domestic law against the other Party on the grounds that it has not 
fulfilled its commitments under the labour agreement. Differences exist within the RTAs remedies. The 
fines collected in the Canada-Chile agreement must be paid into a fund to improve or enhance the labour 
                                                 
91 This is established under Japan-Philippines RTA, Chapter 15: Dispute Avoidance and Settlement. 
92 This must be composed of an arbitrator from each Party, must both propose and agree to a third arbitrator to be the chair of the arbitral tribunal. This chair cannot be a national 
of either Party, nor have residence in either Party, nor be employed by either Party. 
93 US-Jordan RTA. Article 17.4(c). 
94 US-Singapore, US-Morocco US-Oman, US-Chile, US-Peru and US-CAFTA-DR RTAs. 
95 The Canada-Chile, Canada-Costa Rica and the NAFTA RTAs. 
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law enforcement in the Party complained against, consistent with its own law. The amount of the fine should 
relate to specific factors, including the pervasiveness of the persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce 
its labour standards, the level of enforcement reasonably be expected of a Party given its resource 
constraints, the reasons provided for not fully implementing an action plan and efforts made to remedy the 
pattern of non-enforcement since the final panel report. The Canada-Costa Rica RTA on the other hand, 
precludes monetary remedies or any measure affecting trade.96 Instead, the complaining Party may modify 
their cooperative activities to encourage the other Party to remedy the persistent pattern of non-
enforcement of labour laws. Some indicative cooperative activities include seminars conferences and 
training sessions, joint research projects, technical assistance.97 
The NAALC dispute settlement provisions potentially provide the greatest rights of action by 
ensuring that anyone with a ‘legally-recognized interest’ should have access to tribunals for the enforcement 
of the Party's domestic labour law.98 The National Administrative Office (NAO) in each signatory’s labour 
department receives and processes submissions concerning non-enforcement of labour law in either of the 
two other countries. The NAOs are obliged to provide information, if requested, from any of the other 
NAOs and if necessary request ministerial consultations. Crucially, for any problems involving the right of 
freedom of association the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike, dispute settlement is confined 
to diplomatic avenues. That is, if diplomacy cannot resolve the dispute, no further action can be taken under 
the agreement.  
In cases of child labour; minimum employment standards and occupational safety and health, an 
ad hoc Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) appointed by the ministerial council can produce a report 
and recommendations for review by the Ministerial Council and if necessary appoint an arbitration 
tribunal.99 A persistent pattern of non-enforcement can ultimately result in fines to be paid into a fund to 
improve enforcement of labour law in the offending country. If these fines are not paid, trade sanctions 
may be imposed.100 The procedural guarantees provision sets out a more extensive list of remedies including: 
orders, compliance agreements, fines, penalties, imprisonment, injunctions or emergency workplace 
closures. The transparency provisions are also stronger, allowing third Parties with a recognized interest to 
participate in consultations, while Council recommendations may be made public. 
 
Post-2010 RTAs 
 
Under the EU Singapore RTA, if there is disagreement on any labour matter arising under the trade and 
sustainable development Chapter, the Parties only have recourse to Government Consultations and Panel 
of Experts. The general RTA Dispute Settlement chapter and chapter on the Mediation Mechanism do not 
apply to the labour provisions set out in this Chapter.101 The Panel of Experts issues an interim and a final 
report setting out the findings of facts, the applicability of the relevant provisions and the basic rationale 
behind any findings and recommendations. The Parties must then discuss appropriate measures to be 
implemented taking into account the report and recommendations of the Panel of Experts. The follow-up 
to the report and the recommendations of the Panel of Experts shall be monitored by the Board. 
Stakeholders may submit observations to the Board in this regard. 102 This model is replicated under the 
EU-CETA agreement. However, an addition requirement is included to note that the Parties understand 
that the labour obligations included are binding and enforceable through the procedures for the resolution 
of disputes provided within the chapter. Within this context, the Parties shall discuss, through the meetings 
of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, the effectiveness of the implementation of the 
Chapter. 103 
Under both the USMCA104 and the CPTPP,105 a Party may request labour consultations with 
another regarding any matter arising under this Chapter. If the consulting Parties have failed to resolve the 
matter, any consulting Party may request that the relevant Ministers of the consulting Parties convene to 
                                                 
96. The Canada-Costa Rica RTA. Article 23.5. 
97 These are listed in the Canada-Costa Rica RTA. Article 12. 
98 The NAFTA/NAALC RTA. Article 4. 
99 The NAFTA NAALC. Article 4. 
100 There is a cap set on fines and trade sanctions: the lower of either: 0.007% of the volume of trade between the two countries or US$ 20 million. 
101 EU – Singapore Article 12.16 Government Consultations 
102 EU- Singapore Article 12.16 Government Consultations 
103 CETA Article 23.11  
104 USMCA Article 23.17: Labor Consultations 
105 CPTPP Article 19.15: Labour Consultations 
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consider the matter at issue having recourse to such procedures as good offices, conciliation or mediation. 
If the consulting Parties have failed to resolve the matter within 60 days, the requesting Party may call for 
the establishment of a panel. These labour consultations shall be confidential and without prejudice to the 
rights of a Party in another proceeding. Further, no Party shall have recourse to the general dispute 
settlement under Chapter 31 for a matter arising under this Chapter without first seeking to resolve the 
matter in accordance with this Article. 
Assessing labour law in RTAs 
When compared to the GATT/WTO, it is clear from that more and more RTAs now routinely have 
labour regimes and some even go as far as establishing regional agencies to monitor and implement the 
RTA’s labour provisions. However, a significant feature here is that in all of these agreements each Party 
makes a commitment to protect the agreed-upon labour rights in its own domestic territory. None of the 
agreements creates a right of enforcement by one Party to an agreement within the territory of another 
signatory Party. For those advocating the effective implementation of high labour standards, this could be 
seen as a weakness. For instance, the labour laws and constitutions of the CAFTA-DR countries are 
already comparable to ILO core labour standards but have not been enforced effectively. Successive 
governments have lacked the capacity to enforce their own respective domestic labour laws due to 
financial and political constraints. This implies the need for capacity building and financial prioritising 
rather than creating more labour law. 
As the first RTA to incorporate labour regulation issues in RTA negotiations, the NAFTA’s 
labour side agreement - the North Atlantic Agreement on Labor Cooperation (the NAALC) - was seen by 
many to be a positive regulatory departure. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now widely viewed to 
contain significant flaws. Its strength is limited because it does not incorporate by reference, a set of 
international labour rights and standards; it commits the signatories to enforce their national labour law. 
The overall impact of the agreement is therefore contradictory. In some respects, the NAALC labour 
principles go beyond the core labour rights embodied in the 1998 ILO Declaration and the NAALC calls 
on all three governments to improve performance referencing these rights and standards. However, there 
is no enforceable obligation to do so.106 The NAALC also provides that a Party does not violate its 
obligation to enforce its labour legislation if this represents a bona fide decision to allocate resources to 
other labour or environmental matters respectively.107 This provision is vague but it applies to both the 
‘setting’ and enforcement of labour legislation and could potentially serve as a loophole to the agreement’s 
other obligations.  Now it is known that the DSM is both quasi-diplomatic and bureaucratically 
cumbersome, requiring over 30 months to reach its final stages. And while the agreement allows for 
‘interested Parties’ to have access to the DSM, it does not define what constitutes an ‘interested’ Party. 
This may, for instance, exclude those parties without legal standing in the domestic legal system of the 
allegedly non-compliant Party, such as international trade unions and human rights NGOs. This would 
significantly reduce the ability of international ‘interested parties’ to use the provisions of the agreement to 
promote labour standards. Yet despite these shortcomings, the reciprocity of labour obligations included 
within this side agreement has led to complaints about U.S. labour practices, which was unforeseen by 
most. Several NAO submissions have resulted in Ministerial Consultations. Most complaints have been 
allegations of failure to enforce the right to free association and organization. It has also been argued that 
the publicity achieved by these complaints has had positive repercussions for labour law enforcement 
generally in these countries.108 
The RTAs signed since the 2010 still continue to restrict the obligations of the Parties enforcing 
domestic legislation. However, the scope of the obligations has expanded in all the recent RTAs, most 
significantly under the USMCA, which includes provisions guarding against discrimination in terms of 
gender and non-national migrant workers. 
                                                 
106 During the NAFTA NAALC negotiations, the Mexican and Canadian Parties refused to agree to any commitment to international standards. In Canada this was seen as a 
constitutional issue because most labour law is provincial. In Mexico, it has been argued that dominant labour unions lobbied successfully to protect their position against 
independent unions. 
107 The NAALC. Article 49(1). The NAAEC. Article 45(1); 
108 Compa, L. NAFTA’s Labor Side Accord: A Three-Year Accounting. NAFTA Law and Business Review of the Americas, Summer 1997. 
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Conclusion 
The UK and Canada are well positioned, with shared values and customs, to commit to a fair and progressive 
free trade agreement. Under normal circumstances, free trade agreements can be controversial and 
politicised issues. In the current political economy, the UK and Canada will need to be mindful of various 
levels of society – civil society including dichotomised fractions supporting protectionism and others 
globalisation as well as the international precedents such as the global architecture and trends in RTAs. 
Above, we have described how changes environmental and labour provisions in RTAs relate to global trends 
and state sovereignty, both spheres relate to the current political economy and a potential Canada-UK free 
trade agreement. However, there are gaps in the literature that would benefit from further exploration.  
The literature review on the fractures in our societies makes clear that the impact of Brexit on the 
UK economy will be negative and profound – but that the magnitude of impact will depend greatly on what 
the new relationship looks like and what the UK relationships with other countries look like. Overall, Brexit 
will reduce income per capita in the UK and the best way to mitigate the economic costs of leaving will be 
for the UK to remain closely integrated into the European single market and to maintain similar access to 
other partner countries that the UK currently enjoys through EU membership. As Brexit and the backstop 
have yet to be concluded, it is difficult to know the limitations and opportunities the UK will have before it 
until a resolution has been decided.  To what degree can the UK seek assurances from other potential RTA 
or bilateral trade partners as March 2019 approaches? Some countries, like Canada have committed to 
transferring EU RTA provisions to the UK after Brexit. How long will it take for those agreements to be 
renegotiated and to what ends? As above, this instability creates business uncertainty which will also have 
an adverse effect on the UK economy. 
Focusing on the international sphere, governments now successfully negotiate very comprehensive 
labour and environmental provisions in RTAs and reference multilateral labour and environmental 
standards in a manner the WTO is unlikely to be able to do in the foreseeable future. Although there are 
also examples of both developed and developing countries that will not include labour and/or 
environmental provisions in their trade agreements unless they are negotiating with either the US or the 
EU,109 indicating that there is not a distinct developed versus developing country policy position on the 
place of these non-trade issues within a regional trade agreement.  
Those RTAs which include labour and environmental provisions aiming to promote international 
principles and standards, typically reference the ILO Declaration and MEAs respectively. These RTAs 
explicitly try to develop textual coherence and legal integration with the wider body of international law, as 
well as referencing both the language and some agreements of the GATT/WTO. Nevertheless, even in the 
RTAs with the strongest obligations, the commitments are restricted to effective domestic law enforcement, 
the need to show the impact of a violation on trade between the parties to the agreement, or the threat of 
retaliatory action was removed by the exchange of side letters between the parties.  
Whether or not these legal provisions can meet their policy objectives still remains dependent on 
domestic factors such as the political will and resources to enforce these laws. For example, the difficulty 
appointing panels through consensus under the old NAFTA chapter 20 has not been effectively addressed 
in the new NAFTA USMCA, nor has the lack of transparency on the panel appointment system.  That is, 
if the challenge is in the implementation rather than the creation of such regulation then these RTAs could 
be doing little more than duplicating existing law and institutional arrangements - unless they offer a stronger 
incentive to implement than currently exists at the multilateral or national level. This suggests further 
research is necessary to identify whether this is possible within a fair and progressive future FTA between 
the UK and Canada.  
FTAs with substantive environmental provisions rose from 30 % in 2010 to nearly 70 % in 2012, 
and can now be considered the norm.110 Similarly, the amount of labour provisions in FTAs multiplied from 
4 in 1995 to 37 out of 186 FTAs in force notified to the WTO in 2009.111 This paper charts the legal 
development of environmental and labour regimes in RTAs since the 1994 NAFTA up to the renegotiated 
NAFTA – the 2018 USMCA. It identifies the different approaches followed by governments seeking to 
regulate labour and the environment within the territories of the parties to these regional agreements. It uses 
this comparative historical assessment of the scope and strength of these regimes, to identify areas for 
further research with reference to a future UK-Canada fair and progressive FTA.  
                                                 
109 Australia, Singapore, India, Malaysia, Korea, Japan, and the EFTA countries. 
110 C. George, “Environment and regional trade agreements. Emerging trends and policy drivers”, OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers 2014/02, p.9.  
111 ILO, “World work report 2009: The global jobs crisis and beyond”, International Institute for Labour Studies, 2009, p.63. 
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This paper shows that despite the shift towards including comprehensive labour and environmental 
regulation within RTAs, there remain strict limits to how far these regimes can promote these policy 
objectives. Further research is required to identify how a more progressive FTA could be designed to more 
directly address issues such as independently monitoring and enforcing labour and human rights, or 
achieving government’s nationally determined contributions to reduce harmful emissions under the Paris 
Agreement.  
There are a number of issues that must be identified when proceeding with this Canada-UK free 
trade agreement project. First, Canada’s Constitution and the UK’s devolution legislations assign 
jurisdictional authorities to the sub-state regions. There are significant differences between the Canadian 
and British systems that need to be understood. Second, both countries must ensure the legitimacy of this 
trade agreement. The legitimacy of a federal state is its ability to produce results,112 and with respect to a 
free trade agreement, it is a state’s ability to successfully negotiate, ratify, and implement the agreement. 
Third, what are some of the domestic tensions that could derail a successful trade deal? Finally, with the 
differences in the two countries, what can be learnt from previous trade agreements and emulated going 
forward? 
 
                                                 
112 Bakvis and Skogstad (2012) p. 3. 
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Appendix: Table 1: Environmental provisions of  selected RTAs  
FTA 
 
 
Year Preamble 
Objectives 
General 
Excepts 
Hierarchy of Treaty Obligations Investment Level of 
Protection 
Agency DSM Remedies Private Access to 
Remedies 
USMCA 2018 WTO+ WTO+ MEAs to which they are a party to 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1979 
WTO+ Domestic     
CPTPP 2018 WTO+ WTO+ MEAs to which they are a party to 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1979 
WTO+ Domestic     
CETA 2017 WTO+ WTO+ MEAs to which they are a party to 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1979 
WTO+ Domestic     
EU-Sing 2016 WTO+ WTO+ MEAs to which they are a party to 
UNFCC 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1979 
WTO+ Domestic     
Aus-Sing 2003     Domestic     
Aus-Thai 2004     Domestic     
Sin-NZ 2000   Others113  Domestic     
Sin-Kor 2005   Others, including WTO114 WTO+ Domestic     
Sin-India 2006 WTO115 WTO+116 Others117  Domestic     
Can-Chile 1996 WTO+ WTO+118 Others119 
Stockholm Declaration 1972  
Rio Declaration 1992 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1979 
Montreal Protocol, 1990 
Basel Convention, 1989 
WTO+ Domestic     
                                                 
113Article 80 states that ‘nothing in this Agreement shall be regarded as exempting either Party to this Agreement from its obligations under any international, regional or bilateral agreements to which it is a party and any inconsistency with the provisions of this Agreement shall be 
resolved in accordance with the general principles of international law.  
114Article 1.3 affirms the Parties existing rights and obligations with respect to each other under existing bilateral and multilateral agreements to which both Parties are party, including the WTO Agreement.  
115Replicates the language of the GATT/WTO preamble. 
116Singapore-India exceptions include those: ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health and relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.’ 
117Article 16.5 uses the same language as the Singapore-NZ FTA, ibid.  
118Canada-Chile: The Parties understand that the measures referred to in Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 include environmental measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and that Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 applies to measures relating to the 
conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources.  
119In addition to a preamble objective similar to that in the Australia-Singapore agreement, the side agreement on environmental provisions includes: Article 40: Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to affect the existing rights and obligations of either Party under other 
international environmental agreements, including conservation agreements, to which such Party is a party.  
  23 
FTA 
 
 
Year Preamble 
Objectives 
General 
Excepts 
Hierarchy of Treaty Obligations Investment Level of 
Protection 
Agency DSM Remedies Private Access to 
Remedies 
Can-Cos 2002 WTO+ WTO+120 CCRFTA121 
Stockholm Declaration 1972  
Rio Declaration 1992 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1979 
Montreal Protocol, 1990 
Basel Convention, 1989 
 Domestic     
Chile-EU 2002 WTO    Domestic     
Chile-Efta 2003 WTO    Domestic     
Efta-Mex 2000 WTO    Domestic     
Efta-Sin 2002 WTO  Others122  Domestic     
Efta-Kor 2005 WTO  Others123  Domestic     
Jap-Sin 2002     Domestic     
Jap-Mex 2004   GATT/WTO 
Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism  
WTO+124 Domestic     
Jap-Phil 2006   WTO WTO+ Domestic     
US-Jordan 2000 WTO+ WTO+125 WTO 
The International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (1991) Articles 1-22 
 Domestic     
NAFTA/ 
NAAEC 
1993 WTO+ WTO+126 NAFTA 
Pre-existing MEA obligations127 
Stockholm Declaration 1972  
Rio Declaration 1992 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
    Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1979 
Montreal Protocol, 1990 
WTO+128 Domestic     
                                                 
120As in Canada-Chile op cit 102. 
121As in Canada-Chile Article 40 op cit 102, but also Article I.3 The Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations with respect to each other under the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and other agreements to which such Parties are party. 2. In 
the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and such other agreements, this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement.  
122Efta-Singapore: Article 4 Relationship to Other Agreements The provisions of this Agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the other agreements negotiated 
thereunder to which they are a party and any other international agreement to which they are a party.  
123As in Efta-Singapore ibid. 
124Article 74 The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an 
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its Area of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the Parties shall consult with a view 
to avoiding any such encouragement.’ (emphasis added).  
125 As in Canada-Chile, op cit 102. 
126 As in Canada-Chile op cit 102. 
127 Article 40: Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to affect the existing rights and obligations of the Parties under other international environmental agreements, including conservation agreements, to which such Parties are party. 
128 Article 1114(2) NAFTA uses the same language and therefore level of compulsion as in Japan – Mexico Article 74. op cit 108. 
  24 
FTA 
 
 
Year Preamble 
Objectives 
General 
Excepts 
Hierarchy of Treaty Obligations Investment Level of 
Protection 
Agency DSM Remedies Private Access to 
Remedies 
Basel Convention, 1989 
Canada-US agreement on the Transboundary Movement 
of Hazardous Waste, 1986. 
Mexico-US cooperation agreement for the Protection and 
Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, 
1983. 
US-Chile 2003 WTO+ WTO+129 WTO; pre-existing MEA obligations WTO+130 Domestic     
US-Mor 2004 WTO+ WTO+131 Pre-existing MEA obligations WTO+132 Domestic     
US-Aus 2004 WTO WTO+133 WTO WTO+134 Domestic     
US-Bah 2004 WTO+ WTO+135 WTO WTO+136 Domestic     
CAFTA-
DR-US 
2004 WTO+ WTO+137 WTO; Central American integration instruments WTO+138 Domestic     
US-Peru 2006 WTO WTO+139 WTO WTO+140 Domestic     
US-Oman 2006 WTO WTO+141 WTO; pre-existing MEA obligations WTO+142 Domestic     
US-Kor 2007 WTO WTO Balancing obligations of conflicting agreements WTO+143 Domestic     
                                                 
129 The US-Chile RTA Article 9.16 goes beyond GATT Article XX: The Parties understand that sub-paragraph 1(b) ‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Parties 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining measures: (b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health’, includes environmental 
measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.  
130  For example, the US-Chile RTA Article 10.12: Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory 
is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.  
131  As in the US-Chile RTA Ibid.  
132  As in the US-Chile RTA op cit 114. 
133  As in the US-Chile RTA op cit 114. 
134  As in the US-Chile RTA op cit 114. 
135  As in the US-Chile RTA op cit 114. 
136  For example, the US-Bahrain RTA Article 16.2 states: ‘each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those laws as an 
encouragement for trade with the other Party, or as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in its territory.’  
137As in the US-Chile RTA op cit 114 
138As in the US-Chile RTA op cit 114 
139As in Canada-Chile op cit 102. 
140As in the US-Chile RTA op cit 114. 
141As in the US-Chile RTA op cit 114.  
142 As in the US-Chile RTA op cit 114. 
143The US-Korea RTA. Article 20.3:2. 
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Table 2: Selected aspects of  labour provisions in RTAs  
FTA 
 
 
Year Preamble ILO 
Decl. 
Lab & 
Inv 
Level of 
Protection 
DSM Remedies144 Private 
Access145 
Agency146 
USMCA 2018 WTO+ ILO+  Domestic     
CPTPP 2018 WTO+   Domestic     
CETA 2017 WTO+   Domestic     
EU-Sing 2016 WTO+   Domestic     
Aus-Sin 2003         
Aus-Thai 2004         
Sin-NZ 2000         
Sin-Kor 2005         
Sin-Ind  2006         
Can-Chi 1996 WTO+147 ILO+148  Domestic   Domestic 149 
Can-Cos 2002         
Chi-EU 2002    Domestic     
Chi-Efta 2003         
Efta-Mex 2000         
Efta-Sin 2002         
Efta-Kor 2005         
Jap-Sin 2002         
Jap-Mex 2004         
Jap-Mal 2005         
Jap-Phil 2006  150 151 Domestic   Domestic  
NAFTA 1993 WTO+ ILO+152  Domestic   Domestic 153 
  
                                                 
144Remedies are payments or actions ordered by a court as settlement of a dispute. Remedies most commonly comprise of damages - a payment of money. 
145Private access refers to the rights of non-governmental actors to access the dispute settlement mechanism. 
146This definition of ‘agency’ does not include a national contact point. 
147As discussed in Section 5, the GATT/WTO preamble language refers solely to raising standards of living and ensuring full employment Thus an RTA preamble statement that 
refers to anything beyond this, such as strengthening labour standards, goes beyond the WTO preamble and can therefore be considered to be WTO+.  
148This agreement includes: a) minimum employment standards; b) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses; and c) compensation in cases of occupational injuries or illnesses 
- in addition to the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work included in the ILO Declaration. 
149Article 9:1: provides that: ‘There shall be a Ministerial Council that comprises Ministers responsible for labour affairs of the Parties or their designees.’ 
150This agreement does not specifically mention the ILO rather: ‘internationally recognized labour rights.’ 
151Japan-Philippines Article 103 states: ‘The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor 
laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws in a manner that weakens 
or reduces adherence to the internationally recognized labor rights referred to in paragraph 2 below as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention 
of an investment in its Area. If a Party considers that the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the Parties shall consult 
with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.’  
152In addition to the ten labour rights affirmed in the Canada-Chile Agreement, NAFTA’s NAALC also provides for equal protection for migrant workers. 
153NAALC Article 8 states that: ‘The Parties establish the Commission for Labor Cooperation, comprising of a ministerial Council and a Secretariat and assisted by the National 
Administrative Office of each Party.’ 
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Table 3: List of  RTAs examined 
FTA 
 
 
Year Preamble ILO 
Decl. 
Lab & 
Inv 
Level of 
Protection 
DSM Remed
ies 
Private 
Access 
Agency 
US-Jor 2000 WTO+  154 Domestic   Domestic  
US-Sin 2003 WTO155  156 Domestic   Domestic  
US-Chi 2003 WTO+  157 Domestic   Domestic 158 
US-Mor 2004 WTO+  159 Domestic   Domestic 160 
US-Cafta- 
Dr 
2004 WTO+  161 Domestic   Domestic 162 
US-Aus 2004 WTO+  163 Domestic     
US-Bah 2004 WTO+  164 Domestic   Domestic  
US-Oman 2006 WTO+  165 Domestic   Domestic 166 
US-Peru 2006 WTO+  167 Domestic   Domestic 168 
US-Kor 2007 WTO+  169 Domestic   Domestic 170 
 
                                                 
154 Article 6.2 states that ‘The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade by relaxing domestic labor laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does 
not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws as an encouragement for trade with the other Party.’  
155 Follows GATT/WTO preamble language referring solely to raising standards of living and ensuring full employment. 
156 Article 17.2.2. is similar to Japan-Philippines op cit 3. 
157 Article 18.2.2 is similar to Japan-Philippines op cit 3. 
158 Article 18.4 provides that ‘The Parties hereby establish a Labor Affairs Council, comprising cabinet-level or equivalent representatives of the Parties, or their designees.’n 
159 Article 16.2.2. is similar to Japan-Philippines op cit 3.  
160 US-Morocco Article 16.4 ‘Each Party shall designate an office within its labor ministry that shall serve as a contact point with the other Party and the public for purposes of 
implementing this Chapter.’ 
161 Article 16.2.2 is similar to Japan Philippines op cit 3. 
162 Article 16.4 is similar to the US-Morocco provision op cit 11. 
163 Article 18.2.2 is similar to Japan-Philippines op cit 3. 
164 Article 15.2.2 is similar to Japan-Philippines op cit 3. 
165 Article 16.2.2 is similar to Japan-Philippines op cit 3. 
166 Article 16.4.2 is similar to US-Morocco op cit 14. 
167 Article 17.2.2 is similar to Japan Philippines op cit 3. 
168 Article 17.4:1 states that ‘The Parties hereby establish a Labor Affairs Council (Council) comprising cabinet-level or equivalent representatives of the Parties, who may be 
represented on the Council by their deputies or high-level designees.’ 
169 Article 19.3.1(a).  
170 Article 19.5 establishes a Labor Affairs Council comprising of appropriate senior officials from the labour ministry and other appropriate agencies of each Party. 
